There are two standard ways to establish consistency in set theory. One is to prove consistency using inner models, in the way that Gödel proved the consistency of GCH using the inner model L. The other is to prove consistency using outer models, in the way that Cohen proved the consistency of the negation of CH by enlarging L to a forcing extension L [G].
Assume that the universe V of all sets is rich in the sense that it contains inner models with large cardinals. Then what is the relationship between Easton's model L [G] and V ? In particular, are these models compatible, in the sense that they are inner models of a common third model? If not, then the failure of GCH at every regular cardinal is consistent only in a weak sense, as it can only hold in universes which are incompatible with the universe of all sets. Ideally, we would like L [G] to not only be compatible with V , but to be an inner model of V .
We say that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model, under the assumption that there are inner models with large cardinals. By specifying what large cardinals are required, we obtain a new type of consistency result. Let Con(ZFC + ϕ) stand for "ZFC + ϕ is consistent" and Icon(ZFC + ϕ) stand for "there is an inner model of ZFC + ϕ". A typical consistency result takes the form
Con(ZFC + LC) → Con(ZFC + ϕ)
where LC denotes some large cardinal axiom. An internal consistency result takes the form
Icon(ZFC + LC) → Icon(ZFC + ϕ).
Thus a statement ϕ is internally consistent relative to large cardinals iff Icon(ZFC + ϕ) follows from Icon(ZFC + LC) for some large cardinal axiom LC.
A statement can be consistent without being internally consistent relative to large cardinals. An example is the statement that there are no transitive models of ZFC, which fails in any inner model, assuming there are inner models with inaccessible cardinals. Another example is:
For each infinite regular cardinal κ there is a nonconstructible subset of κ whose proper initial segments are constructible.
This can be forced over L, but does not hold in any inner model, assuming the existence of 0 # .
If the consistency of a statement without parameters is shown using set forcing, then it is usually easy to prove its internal consistency relative to large cardinals; some examples are mentioned below. But this is not the case for statements that contain uncountable parameters or for statements whose consistency is shown through the use of class forcing. In these latter cases, questions of internal consistency and of internal consistency strength can be quite interesting, as we shall now see.
Easton's theorem revisited
Let Reg denote the class of infinite regular cardinals and Card the class of all infinite cardinals. An Easton function is a class function F : Reg → Card such that: 
The singular cardinal hypothesis
The analog of Cohen's result for the singular cardinal hypothesis is: On the other hand, it is possible to choose K differently, so as to witness the internal consistency relative to large cardinals of Global Gitik:
Theorem 10. Suppose that there is an inner model containing a measurable limit κ of totally measurable cardinals, where κ is countable in V . Then there is an inner model in which Global Gitik holds.
What is the internal consistency strength of Global Gitik, i.e., what large cardinal hypothesis must hold in some inner model to obtain an inner model of Global Gitik?
Theorem 10 provides an upper bound. In analogy to the proof of the internal consistency relative to 0 # of Easton's result, one would expect that a # for a proper class of totally measurables, a weaker assumption, would also suffice.
But unlike with Easton's result, it is possible that the internal consistency strength of Global Gitik is the same as its external consistency strength, i.e., just a proper class of totally measurable cardinals, without its #. The next result is an example of this unexpected phenomenon.
A cardinal κ is Jonsson iff every structure of cardinality κ for a countable language as a proper substructure of cardinality κ. By work of Mitchell [12] 
Two more internal consistency results
Katherine Thompson ( [9] ) and I have studied the global complexity of universal classes for certain types of structures. For a regular cardinal λ, we say that a poset P omits λ chains iff there is no order-preserving embedding of λ into P . 
Theorem 12. Assume that 0 # exists. Suppose that F is an Easton function in L which is L-definable without parameters. Also suppose that λ is a parameter-free L-definable function which to each L-regular cardinal κ > ω associates a regular L-cardinal λ(κ) ≤ κ. Then there is an inner model with the same cofinalities as L in which
For F and λ as above, we also obtain the internal consistency of 2 κ = F (κ) and K(κ, λ(κ)) = κ + for each L-regular κ > ω ("low complexity"). But we do not know if this statement is internally consistent relative to large cardinals if κ + is replaced by κ ++ .
The situation is similar concerning a joint result with Natasha Dobrinen ( The property expressed in this theorem is internally consistent relative to a proper class of ω 1 -Erdős cardinals provided we restrict κ to be a successor cardinal; otherwise the question is open and would appear to require at least the internal consistency of a proper class of Woodin cardinals.
THE INNER MODEL HYPOTHESIS
Recall that a statement is internally consistent iff it holds in some inner model. Therefore the meaning of internal consistency depends on what inner models exist. If we enlarge the universe, it is possible that more statements become internally consistent.
The inner model hypothesis asserts that the universe has been maximised with respect to internal consistency in the following sense: if a statement without parameters holds in an inner model of some outer model of V (i.e., in a model compatible with V ) then it already holds in an inner model of V . This is formalised by regarding V as a countable transitive model of ZFC, taking the countable transitive models of ZFC of the same ordinal height which contain it as its outer models and taking the countable transitive models of ZFC of the same ordinal height contained in it as its inner models.
The strong inner model hypothesis, introduced later, has considerable large cardinal strength. This shows that a considerable part of our basic assumption, that of the internal consistency of large cardinals, is derivable from a natural absoluteness principle, the maximisation of internal consistency.
We next observe that the inner model hypothesis can be regarded as a second-order generalisation of:
Parameter-free Lévy-Shoenfield absoluteness. Suppose that ϕ is a Σ 1 sentence true in an extension of V . Then ϕ is true in V .
Recall that Σ 1 formulas are persistent in the sense that if such a formula is true in a transitive set, it is also true in all larger transitive sets. We consider persistent second-order formulas: A formula is persistently Σ where ψ is first-order. We now regard V as a model of (Gödel-Bernays) class theory, endowed with both sets and classes. By an outer model of V we mean a model of class theory V * , with the same ordinals as V , whose sets include the sets of V and whose classes include the classes of V . Clearly if V satisfies a persistent Σ Remark. The inner model hypothesis implies absoluteness for sentences which are Σ 2 over H(ω 1 ) (equivalently, for sentences which are Σ 1 3 in the sense of descriptive set theory). This is because by Lévy-Shoenfield absoluteness, such a sentence is true iff it is true in some inner model. Proof. With arbitrary ordinal parameters, inconsistency results from the fact that ℵ 1 can be countable in an outer model. To obtain an inconsistency with arbitrary real parameters, argue as follows. By (a) of Theorem 15, even the parameter-free version implies the existence of a real R such that
is countable" (with parameter R) holds in some outer model but not in any inner model. So instead we consider absolute parameters, as in [6] . For a set p and two transitive models V 0 , V 1 containing p as an element, we say that p is absolute between V 0 and V 1 via the formula ψ iff ψ is a first-order formula without parameters which defines p both in V 0 and in V 1 .
Inner model hypothesis with absolute parameters
Suppose that p is absolute between V and V * , where V * is an outer model of V , and ϕ is a first-order sentence with parameter p which holds in an inner model of V * . Then ϕ holds in an inner model of V .
Theorem 17. ([10]) The inner model hypothesis with absolute parameters is inconsistent.
To obtain the strong inner model hypothesis, we restrict ourselves to absolute ordinal parameters.
Strong inner model hypothesis
Suppose that the ordinal α is absolute between V and V * , where V * is an outer model of V , and ϕ is a first-order sentence with parameter α which holds in an inner model of V * . Then ϕ holds in an inner model of V .
Remark. If above we assume that the sentence ϕ holds not just in an inner model of V * but in V * itself, then in the conclusion we may demand that α be absolute between V and an inner model of V witnessing ϕ, via the same formula ψ witnessing the absoluteness of α between V and V * . This is because we can replace the sentence ϕ by: "ϕ holds and α is defined by ψ". 
